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Resolving African crises:  
Leadership role for African States 
and the African Union in Darfur
Abstract
The article examines the intersections between politics and economic 
development issues in the violence-ravaged Darfur region of Sudan. Also, the 
constraints and opportunities available to the United Nations, the African Union, 
and other entities to help bring the violence to an end are analysed. Within the 
context of the Responsibility to Protect argument and the new African Union’s 
desire to protect citizens against government violence in Africa, the question is: 
Does the AU have the capability to protect citizens against government violence? 
With a specific focus on Sudanese Darfur, the article offers a strategic vision for 
reducing and hopefully ending human rights violations that have ravaged much 
of sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that in order for the UN and AU to fully protect 
citizens against government-sponsored violence, the self-empowerment of 
African States, regional African Organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
citizens and the African Union must be recognised as the first lines of defence 
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against government and government-sponsored atrocities against citizens. The 
article concludes with recommendations for ending the violence in Darfur.
Introduction
The organisation of the international political system as it currently exists 
privileges the rights of the state over those of individuals. The state's capacity to 
protect while simultaneously constraining citizens’ rights reigns supreme over 
its territory. This relationship between the state and the citizens has made it 
possible for governments to claim sovereign authority over their territories – 
including the sovereign right to relate to their citizens peacefully or with coercive 
force. The latter has frequently resulted in gross violations of human rights 
across the globe. In many African states (such as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Apartheid South Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia 
and Rwanda), these violations intensified following political independence 
and the development of the unwritten rule of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of member states by the moribund Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
Intrastate conflicts, especially the Rwandan genocide, awakened Africans and 
their leaders to a central norm across the continent: the inviolable essence of 
human life. 
Many of the states experiencing this awakening are currently ravaged by 
violence, disease, poor public policies and, in many instances, state incapacity to 
carry out the basic function of maintaining law and order to protect the citizens. 
Consequently, Africans and members of the international community continue 
to advocate for the human rights of individuals trapped within the boundaries 
of corrupt and inefficient states – states that are unwilling or unable to carry out 
their basic security functions to protect their citizens. However, both groups have 
largely failed to implement viable and sustainable solutions to the intractable 
crises in many African states. The problem is not whether some Africans and 
their external supporters see human rights protections, stable political systems 
with free market economy, and constitutional liberalism as positive variables 
for ending endemic crises like those in southern Sudan, Darfur, but rather the 
lack of sustainable and institutionalised strategies for effective governance. This 
article offers a strategic vision for reducing and hopefully ending gross human 
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rights violations within the context of intrastate crises that have ravaged much 
of sub-Saharan Africa. The expected peace dividend from the end of the Cold 
War never materialised in sub-Saharan Africa where Western governments’ 
preference for stability continues to privilege autocratic leaders who ascend to 
power through fraudulent electoral results and/or violence; e.g. the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and the Sudan. 
The international community stood by in 1994 while over 800 000 Rwandans 
were slaughtered with the full knowledge and support of their government. Today 
it has responded to the crisis in Darfur. But that response has been practically 
irrelevant as women, children and men are raped, dehumanised and killed on 
a daily basis while the major powers debate the semantics of genocide. A brief 
background is in order.
The context of the Darfur crises
In Sudan, like most other multi-ethnic states in Africa, the struggle for political 
independence rendered ethnicity quite fluid as the goal for the nationalists 
was the attainment of political independence from Britain and Egypt. Sudan 
gained her independence in 1956. However, ‘seeking […] first the political 
kingdom,’ as Kwame Nkrumah asked Africans to do in the 1950s, did not result 
in statewide development – because political independence revealed the dark 
side of tribalism. In Sudan, and consistent with colonial practices elsewhere, the 
result was sustained development in one part of the country, the northern part. 
Scarce resources and uneven development policies and strategies caused western 
Sudan, Darfur, to become the worst neglected region.
M.W. Daly notes that Sudan’s first scientific and only nation-wide census was 
conducted in 1955-56. Population data yield information that should inform 
policy makers of the magnitude of development problems and therefore serve 
as a basis for policy planning and action. But the data, as revealed from the 
1955-56 census in Sudan, were fraudulently interpreted and used to privilege the 
Muslim North by exaggerating their representation in the national population/
institutions. The census played down ethnic differences and therefore under-
reported the proportion of other groups in the state for purposes of power and 
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resource allocation. The resulting tension was not resolved through the political 
process and led to the intractable civil war in contemporary Sudan. 
The census reported the Sudan’s population as 10,263,000. Darfur’s 1.35 
million ranked third only to Blue Nile (2.7 million) and Kordofan (1.76 
million); the six northern provinces comprised about 7.5 million, or 72 
percent of the total, and Darfur therefore almost 18 percent of the north’s 
and 13 percent of the Sudan’s population. Of females over puberty but of 
childbearing age, Darfur had the highest percentage of any province – 24.6 
percent – and between the ages of five and puberty also the highest – 11.4 
percent…. The census found that a bare majority of Sudanese (51 percent) 
spoke Arabic at home, followed by Dinka (11 percent). Arabic was also the 
majority language in Darfur (55 percent); Fur (classified for census purposes 
as three dialects of one language, North, South and West Darfurian), was 
spoken at home by 42 percent (5.6 percent of the Sudan’s population), and 
the rest spoke other languages, none of which accounted for more than 1 
percent of the province’s total (Daly 2007:179-180).1 
Furthermore, in terms of tribe or ‘nationality’, the census found that 375 000 
of Darfur’s people were Arabs (of whom 269 000 were Baqqara) and 758 000 
‘Westerners’ (Fur, Masalit). Among many things, these figures indicate that Arabic 
had become the first language of roughly a third of those considered ethnic 
Fur. These and other figures relating to ethnicity, tribe, and language would 
later assume much more prominence in contemporary Sudanese politics (Daly 
2007:180; Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Social Affairs 1958:23-24).
Population distribution was not the only factor contributing to instability 
in Sudan. The education and employment statistics remain relevant to 
today's events. 
In terms of the highest school attended (by people over the age of puberty), 
no province of the Sudan, including even the South, had a lower percentage 
for intermediate school than Darfur: 0.2 percent; the figure for female was 0. 
1 See also Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Social Affairs 1958:4, 5, 7, 10. 
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Likewise for secondary school attendance, no province had a worse record: 
the Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile matched Darfur at 0.1 percent. For the 
Sudan as a whole, 78 percent of males over the age of puberty had received 
no formal schooling, and 97.3 of females; for Darfur, the figures were 65 
and 99 percent respectively (Daly 2007:180).2
The data provided the government with the necessary ammunition to produce 
an effective national policy for all its citizens. The data should have been used 
for development planning, including job creation and building an intellectual 
infrastructure that would sustain not just Darfur and the southern Sudan, but 
the entire country. 
Of Darfur’s 350,000 males over the age of puberty, 232,000 were farmers, 
38,000 nomadic animal owners, and 31,000 shepherds. There were 158 
male and 37 female primary and intermediate school teachers in the entire 
province. Among medical practitioners, 2 were classified as ‘professional’ 
and 281 as ‘semi-professional’ (including 63 women). There appear to 
have been 783 policemen and prison wardens (4 of whom were women), 1 
professional accountant, and 2 (males) in the field of ‘entertainment.’ Most 
women – 79 percent – were classified as ‘unproductive,’ and the only field in 
which they outnumbered men was ‘Unemployed, beggars’ (Daly 2007:179-
181).3
Given that civil war has been the norm in southern Sudan for these decades, it is 
reasonable to assume that not much has changed in terms of development since 
the sole census in 1995-56. The discovery of crude petroleum in southern Sudan 
has not improved the situation. However, as with other African states, the industry 
is largely based on expatriate employment – in this case, Chinese. Consequently, 
over time, with the lack of external and internal support, the historical neglect 
of Western Sudan by the central government ignited and intensified ethnic 
consciousness and marginal identity in the periphery. The strong nationalistic 
2 See also Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Social Affairs 1958:19.
3 See also Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Social Affairs 1958:38-40, 54-55.
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consciousness that preceded independence died because of poor development 
policies by the central authorities, especially their lack of vision for building a 
truly nationalistic Sudanese state. The personalisation of power by the Muslim 
Arabs in Khartoum and their efforts to create a homogeneous Sudanese culture 
without requisite developmental infrastructure exacerbated the needs and 
desire for ethnic ties and consciousness. These expectations for ethnic unity 
were manifested in the formation of different groups who hoped to achieve for 
themselves what the dominant group within the central government historically 
denied them – effective and significant decision-making capacity. 
The 2003 formation of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM) in 
loose association with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) intensified 
the use of ethnic consciousness as a framework for demanding a seat at the 
national decision-making table. However, SLA/JEM strategy has changed from 
engaging the political process to violent attacks of government targets outside 
of Khartoum. Arguably, the changed strategy from negotiation to violence by 
peripheral groups like SLA/JEM is explained by their fear that Darfur and the 
Western region would be left out of the power-sharing agreements that the 
Government of Sudan was negotiating to end the civil war in southern Sudan. 
Such fear was based on the fact that the central government had repeatedly 
ignored requests for meetings on how best to include the Darfur region on the 
national development agenda. 
The intensified ethnic consciousness born of political struggle for scarce 
resources expanded to include charges of racism against the central government, 
and violence targeting government facilities by ‘rebels’ who defended their 
actions by accusing the government of oppressing black Africans in preference 
of Arabs. The Government of Sudan responded to the informal politics and 
strategies by the rebels with crushing air raids targeting villages believed to 
be rebel strongholds. The government also enlisted the assistance of former 
criminals, bandits, and members of tribes with land conflicts against African 
tribes in Darfur. In addition to providing arms, the government did not object 
to other groups and individuals with different agendas who sought to exploit 
the crisis by joining the ‘Janjaweed’ in terrorising the Darfurians. The Janjaweed, 
or ‘devils on horseback’, have been labeled ‘Arab’ because the majority of their 
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ancestry is more Arab than African – further intensifying the rigidity of the 
alliances in the conflict. 
Originally created and supported by Libya in Western Sudan for attacking Chad, 
the Janjaweed are responsible for the burning and looting of villages across 
Darfur as well as raping, murdering, and kidnapping civilians. There are reports 
of instances where air raids by Sudanese Government forces are strategically 
followed by mop-up operations by the Janjaweed, indicating coordination 
between the government and the Janjaweed, contrary to government claims 
that armed criminals are responsible for most of the Darfur killings. Fear of the 
Janjaweed has forced Darfurians to leave their possessions and homes and relocate 
to camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), mostly in northern Darfur, 
and some to refugee camps in neighbouring Chad. The rise in IDPs and refugees 
has created what numerous groups have labeled the worst humanitarian crisis 
in the world. Racial and ethnic slogans, chants, and the Janjaweed's motivations 
as they taunt, capture, and kill the Darfurians cause many, but especially the US 
government, to go so far as to label the situation as genocide. A United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) report on Sudan (United Nations Security Council 
2007) highlights the awful results of the conflict:
The humanitarian situation in Darfur has suffered from persistent violence 
and overall insecurity. Over two million people are now internally displaced, 
while 1.9 million conflict-affected residents remain largely dependent on 
external aid. Approximately 107,000 civilians were newly displaced by 
insecurity [in] fighting between 1 January and 1 April [2007].
Thus, the Government of Sudan’s policy in Darfur is to bring the conflict to an 
end on its own terms – largely homogenising all the ethnic groups consistent 
with the cultural, language and ethnic consciousness of the ruling northern 
elite. More significantly, given the government’s willingness to negotiate a 
comprehensive peace treaty with the South to end the civil war, it seems clear 
that the strategy adopted by the Darfurians for a share of the national wealth 
and the government’s heavy-handed response suggests the government might 
be more concerned about regime stability than ethnic cleansing or genocide. 
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In this sense, the government’s violent reaction to the Darfuri rebels might be a 
calculated strategy to discourage other potentially marginalised and neglected 
groups from taking up arms against the government. To ensure that the Darfuris 
are not protected from the government and the Janjaweed, the violence sponsored 
by the government extends to the aid and humanitarian workers in the region 
whose work is directly aimed at assisting civilians and providing succour. The 
emergence of the African Union to replace the now defunct OAU – and its odious 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states – thus greatly 
pleased the international community. The AU is seen as a new body with a new 
philosophy of responsibility toward citizens whose governments have failed to 
protect in the midst of violent crises. This so-called humanitarian intervention 
thesis is addressed later. 
Darfur and the African Union
The African Union (AU) was established in 2002 as the successor of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963. Consistent 
with African leaders’ general tendency to emulate Africa’s former colonisers, 
the AU was the natural successor to the OAU, similar to the European Union 
succeeding the European Community. One wonders whether the AU is truly 
African in spirit and form. The OAU was established in 1963 by 31 newly 
independent African states in a spirit of pan-Africanism that aimed to promote 
economic unity, collective security (Zweifel 2006:147), and eventually, political 
unity. Its main strategy for dealing with African problems was to stress the 
principle of ‘peaceful settlements of disputes’ (Murray 2004:118). Without 
effective institutional structures and visionary leadership, its poor record on 
conflict resolution and management was compounded by financial, logistical, 
and political problems. Much of the OAU's failure was due to its policy of non-
interference in states’ internal affairs which weakened its ability to prevent and 
manage conflicts, especially civil wars. Now with 53 African states as members of 
the AU, the added features of intervention, independence, checks and balances, 
and monitoring make the AU potentially a ‘more effective, democratic, and 
autonomous organization’ (Zweifel 2006:148). According to the former OAU 
Secretary-General (and current AU Special Envoy), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the 
promise of the AU is its objectives of ‘enhancing unity, strengthening co-operation 
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and co-ordination as well as equipping the African continent with a legal and 
institutional framework, which would enable Africa to gain its rightful place 
in the community of nations’ (Francis 2005:29). These hopeful objectives are 
rooted in a desire and motivation to ‘enhance the cohesion, solidarity and 
integration of the countries and peoples of Africa’ (Francis 2005:30). The core 
instrument for achieving the above objectives is the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union.
The Constitutive Act empowers states to intervene where countries fail to protect 
their citizens from internal conflicts. Specifically, Article 4(h) of the Principles 
provides: ‘The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity’ (African Union 2000:art 4(h)). This Act 
must not and cannot be impeded by excuses of sovereignty which were used 
to avoid responsibility and action in past instances where intervention would 
have saved millions of lives. Some argue that member states have essentially 
accepted external intervention in their internal affairs in times of serious or 
extreme crisis by signing this Act that runs against the standard practice of 
non-intervention in the UN Charter (Murithi 2005:97). This document, 
however, while continuing to reiterate the importance of promoting peace, 
security, and stability for individuals and the continent also contains clauses 
which affirm the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states 
exclusive of grave violations of human rights and goes so far as to prohibit 
the use of force or threat under the basis of non-interference (African Union 
2000:art 3, 4). Despite these improvements, the AU has inherited many of the 
problems of its predecessor. Sceptics thus warn against prematurely assuming 
this new organisation will ‘significantly enhance the project of uniting Africa 
or strengthen the capacity of states to respond to peace and security issues on 
the continent’ (Francis 2005:30). Perhaps this fear is why the AU established the 
Peace and Security Council (PSC or AUPSC) to prevent, manage, and resolve 
conflicts in the continent. As is profoundly evident in the case of ongoing 
massive slaughter and displacement of certain sections of Sudanese citizens or 
crimes against humanity in Darfur, the strategic question – how to mobilise 
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and deploy collective resources in the continent for realising the goal of conflict 
prevention and management – remains to be substantively unresolved. 
Comprised of 15 rotating members (for either two or three year terms), the 
PSC has ‘powers to anticipate events that may lead to genocide and crimes 
against humanity, recommend the intervention…impose sanctions…and 
follow up in terms of conflict prevention issues of human rights, among 
other things’ (Murray 2004:125). The question may be asked, however, given 
the hegemonic intent in establishing the PSC and its expressed powers, what 
significant and substantive instrument exists to carry out its functions without 
constraints. That is, what functional or institutional power does the PSC have 
over the sovereign leaders of states who may not wish close scrutiny within 
their ‘sovereign territory’? That Article 7 forces African leaders to realise 
that sovereignty does not forever remain a ‘shield from intervention’ (Levitt 
2005:226) is not sufficient without compelling strategic military and political 
instruments of statecraft at the disposal of the AU to realise its stated goals of 
ensuring peace, security and individual human rights. Through the PSC, the AU 
has also authorised the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) made up of 
strictly African soldiers whose responsibility, among others, is to intervene in 
member states where crimes against humanity as outlined in Article 4(h) above 
occur (African Union 2002:art 13). Again, we must ask: Based on what vertical 
decision structure and with what kind of logistical and human resource base will 
the ASF carry out its functions? Indeed, given their current role, which is limited 
to that of humanitarian assistance and ‘alleviating the suffering of civilians in 
conflict areas’ (African Union 2002:art 13), it is most urgent that the AU with 
the full endorsement of African governments, clarify the strategic vision it hopes 
to deploy for its lofty goals before it becomes irrelevant from incapacity as the 
case of Darfur is already demonstrating. However, the establishment of the PSC 
shows the AU’s commitment to ending conflicts through the legal and political 
processes that protect civilians against government and government-sponsored 
violence. Thus, while political and financial enforcement mechanisms in the AU 
and PSC guidelines are clearly specified, the test of the AU’s effectiveness will 
be the extent to which these important steps are tangibly implemented. More 
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significant however, is the strategic process that moves key actors from violence 
to political negotiation, for example in the case of Darfur. 
Given that the current structure of the AUPSC and the ASF places state sovereignty 
above the obligation to protect individuals, it is doubtful that the PSC will be able 
to carry out its functions or that the AU can intervene in a state where genocide 
is occurring if the state government refuses such intervention. Consequently, to 
achieve the goals of protecting individuals against state violence, the AU is more 
likely to succeed if it establishes an African Union Security Command (AU-SC) 
with a standing rapid reaction force for military intervention where the AU 
identifies genocide and/or other state-sponsored crimes against humanity in 
Africa as the first step toward engaging the political process. The AU-SC can 
stand alone or complement other activities by the AUPSC and the ASF. Armed 
and under the command of a reputable and competent leader, the rapid reaction 
function of the AU-SC is more likely to result in the realisation of the AU charter 
by elevating individual rights over state rights, thereby ensuring consistent 
protection of human rights  in the continent. 
Substantively, while state sovereignty remains essential against non-AU threats, 
sovereignty and human rights are enhanced within the continent to the extent 
that AU access to intrastate human rights struggles is not blocked by autocratic 
claims of state sovereignty. In other words, for a political process that privileges 
peace and robust resolution of issues of human rights, force must be compelling 
when government-sponsored violence remains a major obstacle to getting the 
actors to the negotiation table.
The effective functioning of the African Union and its constitutive units is 
needed to curb the crisis in Darfur. Thus, while the AU has worked closely 
with the international community, primarily the UN, in attempting to alleviate 
some of the humanitarian conditions and convince the al-Bashir Government 
to allow a peacekeeping force in Darfur, the AU has only served as monitor of 
cease-fire since 2004 because it lacks the robust logistical and personnel presence 
to be effective. The argument for a more robust AU through the AU-SC is in 
recognition of both the African governments’ desire and the international 
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community’s professed preferences for collective action to end genocide and 
government-sponsored violence against innocent civilians.
While the capacity for collective action in the international community, 
especially the UN, has always existed, it has not been deployed for the protection 
of individuals against their governments in Africa. It seems, however, that the 
UN has been awakened from its slumber to the suffering of Africans at the 
hands of their own governments, for ‘at the United Nations World Summit 
on 17 September 2005, world leaders agreed, for the first time, that states 
have a primary responsibility to protect their own populations and that the 
international community has a responsibility to act when governments fail to 
protect the most vulnerable’ (Jentleson 2007:582). The Responsibility to Protect 
international doctrine pledges ‘to take collective action if national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (Jentleson 2007:583-584). While the 
doctrine provides hope and an enabling framework for collective action to hold 
governments claiming sovereignty without responsibility accountable for the 
atrocities committed against their own citizens, the question is: How can this 
collective responsibility be achieved in situations where governments fail to 
protect their citizens or are complicit in the atrocities committed against them? 
I argue that at the core of realising the UN and AU desires to protect citizens against 
government-sponsored violence is recognising that the self-empowerment of 
African States, regional African Organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
citizens and the African Union are the first lines of defence against government 
and government-sponsored atrocities against their own citizens. Internal 
initiation of an accountability process for the maintenance of sovereignty would 
make it possible for non-African states, organisations and citizens to offer 
effective aid for bringing genocide and other human rights violations in places 
like Darfur to an end. 
While the African Union has its peace security functions and the desire to 
form a union government, it seems conflicted on the nature of the relationship 
between African States and their citizens. Additionally, despite its desire to, 
the AU lacks the logistical and political will to end crimes against humanity in 
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Darfur. Cognisant of the international reality that the UN Security Council is 
responsible for global security and stability, African States formed the African 
Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the only external entity on the ground 
in Darfur with the responsibility to protect civilians. However, because of 
poor capacity and lack of resources, AMIS has failed to competently execute 
its mission as evidenced by the continuing atrocities in the Darfur region and 
in the refugee camps in neighbouring states. That said, most important about 
AMIS is that for the first time since decolonisation, African leaders seem aware 
of their responsibilities to Africans as evidenced by their decision (albeit poorly 
executed thus far) in Darfur. 
While the issues in Darfur as illustrated below are mostly economic and political 
in nature, they lend themselves to verifiable efforts through good faith negotiation 
followed by national policies aimed at their effective resolution, if the political 
will exists in Khartoum to do so. We will first identify the intersecting issues 
– national and international – in the conflict in Darfur and then offer robust 
strategies for how African States and the African Union can start the process 
of protecting the victims of human rights abuses and other atrocities in the 
continent.
Intersecting issues in the Darfur crisis and recommendations
The crisis in Darfur is born of several intersecting, yet separate conflicts. As Scott 
Straus insightfully notes, the crisis is traced to the civil war between the Islamist, 
Khartoum-based national government and two rebel groups – the Sudan 
Liberation Army and the Justice and Equity Movement – based in Darfur.4 As 
previously noted, the rebel groups are fighting because of economic and political 
marginalisation by the national government. In a sense, if the government in 
Khartoum had engineered a national economic and political development plan 
that did not marginalise any section or group in the Sudan, the SPLA/JEM would 
not have had verifiable reason to attack government facilities in 2003 – resulting 
in the national government’s arming of irregular militias to quell the violence 
that escalated to the current level in Darfur. Similarly, the crisis in Darfur is 





related to the civil war that has raged in Sudan since its political independence 
in 1956, in which the Arab-dominated national government and its cultural 
and linguistic homogenisation policies in Sudan created a dyadic civil conflict 
that has been simplistically explained as North-South and Arab-Christian 
conflict in contrast to the core issue of economic and political marginalisation 
of the South by the northern-based government of Sudan. Under the auspices 
of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Sudanese 
government entered into negotiations with the southern rebel groups – which 
did not include Darfuri representatives. The peace negotiation resulted in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement that promised an end to the longest civil war 
in Africa. Consequently, the Darfur rebels attracted attention to their own cause 
of marginalisation as a strategy to mobilise ethnic, regional, continental and 
global attention to the poor economic and political condition. 
The other dimension of the crisis is the localised nature of the race/ethnic 
dimensions of the conflict. As Scott Straus (2005:126) notes:
Darfur is home to some six million people and several dozen tribes. 
But the region is split between two main groups: those who claim black 
‘African’ descent and primarily practice sedentary agriculture, and those 
who claim ‘Arab’ descent and are mostly semi-nomadic livestock herders. 
As in many ethnic conflicts, the divisions between these two groups are 
not always neat; many farmers also raise animals, and the African-Arab 
divide is far from clear. All Sudanese are technically African. Darfurians 
are uniformly Muslim, and years of intermarriage have narrowed obvious 
physical differences between ‘Arabs’ and black ‘Africans.’ Nonetheless, the 
cleavage is real, and recent conflicts over resources have only exacerbated 
it. In dry seasons, land disputes in Darfur between farmers and herders 
have historically been resolved peacefully. But an extended drought and 
the encroachment of the desert in the last two decades have made water 
and arable land much more scarce. Beginning in the mid-1980s, successive 
governments in Khartoum inflamed matters by supporting and arming the 
Arab tribes, in part to prevent the southern rebels from gaining a foothold 
in the region. The result was a series of deadly clashes in the late 1980s and 
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1990s. Arabs formed militias, burned African villages, and killed thousands. 
Africans in turn formed self-defence groups, members of which eventually 
became the first Darfur insurgents to appear in 2003.
That ‘Khartoum instructed the militias to “eliminate the rebellion,” as Sudan’s 
President Omar al-Bashir acknowledged in a December 2003 speech…. [And 
that] Army forces and the militia often attacked together, as janjaweed leaders 
readily admit… and in some cases, government aircraft bomb areas before the 
militia attack, razing settlements and destroying villages’ (Straus 2005:126-127) 
clearly establishes the connection between the government decision to eliminate 
a segment of its population by virtue of who they are perceived to be – black 
African farmers. The ethnic cleansing, massive human rights violations and 
genocide evidenced by the inability of the Darfurians to protect themselves 
against such massive government violence calls for international protection 
consistent with the expressed goals of the United Nations and those of the 
African Union. Documents in the possession of the AU peacekeeping force in 
Darfur indicate the Sudanese Government is directly involved in organising and 
supporting the violence against the Darfurians. 
According to Nicholas Kristof, one document directed the regional commanders 
and security officials to ensure the ‘execution of all directives from the president 
of the republic …. [and to c]hange the demography of Darfur and make it void 
of African Tribes …’ [by] ‘killing, burning villages and farms, terrorizing people, 
confiscating property from members of African tribes and forcing them from 
Darfur’ (Jentleson 2007:446).5 From all accounts, while Darfur like the rest of 
Sudan has been involved in various levels of conflict since the 1950s, the intensity 
of the current conflict measured by the number of casualties – estimated at over 
300 000 deaths and over one million IDPs with hundreds of thousands more in 
various refugee camps outside of Sudan – was ignited by the Sudanese Liberation 
Army’s ‘surprise attack on the airport at El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur 
State’ (Kasfir 2005:196). The Sudanese Government's swift and intense response 
to the SLA attack in 2003 led to an outcry of genocide in Darfur. As Gerard 
Prunier notes, the massive killing in Darfur have a number of explanations: (1) 
5 See also Kristof 2005 and Kasfir 2005:197.
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ancient tribal conflicts reignited by droughts, (2) a counterinsurgency campaign 
by the government of Sudan gone wrong, (3) a deliberate policy of ethnic 
cleansing of African tribes to make room for Arab nomads, and (4) ‘genocide … 
supported by evidence of systematic racial killings’ (Prunier 2006:200). 
While these explanations are important singularly, collectively the timing and 
intensification of the killings suggest deliberate policy, strategy and motive 
by the Government of Sudan to consolidate its power within the country by 
using the SLA/Darfuris rebellion to demonstrate its resolve against other 
marginalised groups’ future efforts to demand a peace negotiation and therefore 
a share of national wealth and power similar to the generous provisions in 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Christian South. And, as Kasfir 
succinctly summarises, ‘One problem in isolating the government’s motives is that 
the Darfur crisis grows out of many conflicts at the local, regional, and national 
levels. These conflicts involve responses to diminished natural resources, to 
ethnic and cultural conflict, to negotiations and the peace agreement in southern 
Sudan, and to the relationship of the national government with impoverished 
and marginalized groups throughout the country’ (Kasfir 2005:197).
The foregoing makes clear that the government of Sudan organised and aided 
the Janjaweed – drawn mostly from marginalised Arab/Muslim communities in 
Darfur to attack, slaughter and displace the non-Arab Darfuris – mostly Africans 
but predominantly Muslims. Arguably, it is also clear that the government chose 
this high-handed approach to the rebels because it was already engaged in a 
peace negotiation process in 2003 with mostly Christian southerners against 
whom it had fought since 1956 and did not want to repeat the process with 
other marginalised groups and regions in the future. 
Interestingly, the political dimension of both the Darfuri rebellion and the 
government’s response holds the key to an effective solution to the crisis in 
Darfur. As articulated by intellectuals from southern Sudan, ‘the central problems 
that pose a threat to peace and unity in the Sudan are attributable to three basic 
causes: (1) the dominance of one nationality over the others; (2) the sectarian 
and religious bigotry that has dominated the Sudanese political scene since 
independence; and (3) the unequal development in the country’ (Akol 1987:15). 
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The question is how to proceed toward the realisation of peace and stability 
throughout Sudan to enable its people to pursue their lives and interests. Given 
the intensity of the violence in Darfur, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
signed in January 2005 between the North and South, as well as the commitment 
of the Government of Sudan to maintaining power, resolving the Darfur crisis 
and indeed, fully upholding the CPA would require robust international and 
regional mediation between the various factions in Sudan.
Toward resolution
The international dimension of the Darfuri rebellion and therefore its partial 
solution is evident in the fact that the peace settlement between the Muslim 
government of Sudan and the Christian southern rebels was already in the 
minds of Washington (with the appointment of Andrew Natsios in May 2001 
as Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan and Senator John Danforth on 
September 6, 2001 as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan – both part of President 
George W. Bush’s conservative Christian constituency). Any hesitation on 
working together to resolve the age-old civil war on the part of both Washington 
and Khartoum was shelved following the terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, 
which provided President Omar al-Bashir’s government – whose human rights 
record was largely seen as repugnant – with an unprecedented but grotesque 
opportunity to play the hero’s part in the fight against terrorism. The Sudanese 
government’s enthusiastic offer of support for the anti-terrorist policy can only 
be read as al-Bashir’s government’s desire not to repeat its earlier strategic error 
of siding with Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War, and therefore, avoiding 
the polarisation of its civil war into Arab-Muslim government versus Christian 
southern rebels that would have increased global support to the rebels, especially 
from Washington if it did not make the correct choice of denouncing terror and 
terrorists on the global stage. As Clement Adibe (2007:26) notes, 
When September 11 attacks occurred … President Bashir firmly denounced 
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda and pledged to cooperate with Washington 
in rooting out the terrorist menace. In Washington, Bashir’s unsolicited 
support, like Ghaddafi’s, was especially well received by Powell’s State 
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Department which was saddled with the task of putting together a ‘coalition 
of the willing’ on a very short notice. … [And] ‘Since 9/11, Bashir has 
provided the U.S. with a steady stream of much-vaunted intelligence’ which 
has been used to track and target al Qaeda networks and funds.
Consequently, Washington rewarded the Sudanese government by supporting 
‘… the lifting of UN sanctions against Sudan on September 28, 2001 ... and 
quietly quelled pending legislation for imposition of capital market sanctions 
… [and for] the next two years, the Bush administration treated Khartoum as 
an ally in its war on terror while Bashir’s security and the Janjaweed roamed 
Darfur with greater impunity’ (Adibe 2007:26). The foregoing indicates that 
the United States has the moral and military force capability and credibility – 
multilaterally or unilaterally – to nudge others toward resolving conflicts like 
the Darfur crisis. I would argue that the United States fails to consistently use its 
capacity to enhance peace and security missions in Africa; or more specifically, 
fails to forcefully use regional and international organisations such as the 
African Union and the United Nations in such projects because there are no 
consistent national interest imperatives in United States foreign policy toward 
Africa. Certainly, there is no consistent African constituency with voting power 
at the congressional district levels to compel action on behalf of Africa.
Similarly, the United Nations and the former Organisation of African Unity did 
not, as collective action institutions, intervene in the internal affairs of an African 
state in protection of the rights of individuals as individuals or as members of 
a group. Even when such intervention would likely have saved hundreds of 
thousands of lives as the case of Rwanda showed, the two institutions did nothing 
beyond engaging in rhetorical debates over state responsibilities to their citizens 
and whether the atrocities qualified as genocide because the interests of the elites 
in these institutions are largely devoid of compassion and commitment to the 
resolution of issues on behalf of the marginalised and disorganised victims of 
both structural and state-supported violence. The role of the AU, however, can 
be more constructive than the conflict-avoidance strategies employed by much 
of the Western world in Africa, and the inaction that plagues the veto-hobbled 
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Security Council organ of the United Nations and the non-interference excuse 
for inaction by the defunct OAU. 
Progressive responsibility to protect argument
While sovereign states are notorious for protecting their rights to internal 
action, multilateral institutions such as the United Nations with codified 
collective security principles have been notorious for insisting on invitation 
from states before intervening in a nation’s internal affairs to protect entrapped 
citizens facing extermination as in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. But 
while powerful states such as the United States in collaboration with regional 
organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will, if 
their interests are at stake, violate the UN principles as was the case in Kosovo 
in 1999, less powerful states and organisations such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa are left to fend for themselves based on the inviolability of the principles 
of sovereignty – at the expense of unprotected citizens in Rwanda in 1994. It 
is illuminating that the US-NATO action in Kosovo in 1999 resulted in ‘… an 
unusual distinction when an independent international commission called the 
US-NATO intervention illegal in the sense of not having followed the letter of 
the UN Charter but legitimate in being consistent with the norms and principles 
that the Charter embodies’ (Jentleson 2007:439, my italics).6
Perhaps the foregoing insight led to the formation of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose 2001 report provides a 
theoretical basis for the responsibility to protect argument. The responsibility to 
protect argument (Jentleson 2007:439; Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo 2000) is based on the core principles that ‘state sovereignty implies 
responsibility’ and that the primary responsibility of a state is the protection 
of people within its territory. In situations ‘where a population is suffering 
serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, 
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle 
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’ 
(Jentleson 2007:439). The responsibility to protect argument further provides 
6 See also Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000.
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for prevention of ‘large scale loss of life’ as its priority with as little coercive force 
as possible; and emphasises that the motive for intervention should be to avert 
human suffering. 
Furthermore, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council should 
agree not to veto resolutions authorising the use of military force when their 
interests are not directly involved. Specifically, it says, ‘The Security Council 
should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its 
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, 
concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of 
that situation – and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may 
suffer thereby’ (Jentleson 2007:439, my italics). Given that the United Nations 
accepted the responsibility to protect argument after both genocide and ethnic 
cleansing occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, the Darfur crisis is the first 
test case for this important international norm and obligation. Thus far the test 
has failed either because Russia and China have material interests in Sudan and/
or because the United States has a verifiable national interest in working with the 
al-Bashir administration whose support for the United States’ war on terrorism 
compels the United States to be diplomatically lenient with its allies. 
An added dimension is the negotiated peace between the Sudanese government 
and the southern rebels to which the United States, the United Nations and 
the African Union were party. As a result, all three are cautious about forcing 
the hands of the Sudanese government, lest it renege on the provisions in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, since the consequence would be a return to 
a massively destabilising war for the country and region. The problem is that 
the African Union’s presence and argument of ‘African solutions to African 
problems’ free the United States, China, Russia and, by extension, other western 
powers from doing much about Darfur beyond diplomatic talk. With its 7 000 
troops and lacking logistical capability in Darfur the AU is unable to provide 
robust and credible protection for its troops or the Darfuris, some of whom 
continue to be killed by Sudanese government forces, rebels and the Janjaweed. 
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What to do?
Clearly, the responsibility to protect argument lacks teeth and the African Union 
lacks the necessary force and capability to significantly help the Darfuris as 
is evident by the partial arrival of the negotiated 20 000 additional troops in 
January 2008. However, it is not a cliché to say the failure to protect the Darfuris 
is the failure of African governments to assume full responsibility for the peoples 
of Africa. If we assume the AU is serious about privileging African peoples over 
state and sovereignty claims, the right to protect does provide for an effective 
role for a regional organisation such as the AU in cases where the UN Security 
Council proves ineffective. The question becomes: What does the AU need to 
do? 
First, there has to be a peace to keep before peacekeeping forces can be brought 
into the region. Therefore, the constraint on reaching and keeping peace in the 
Sudan is directly related to the asymmetry of force between the government of 
Sudan and the Janjaweed on the one hand, and the fragmented and disorganised 
Darfuris and its various splinter groups on the other. Given the core issues for 
the southern Sudanese – autonomy with the right to vote for independence in a 
couple of years from the larger Sudanese state – peace may eventually be settled 
in battle. For Darfuris, economic development and political justice constitute 
the core issues, which unarguably lend themselves to political negotiation. 
Therefore, creating the space for political negotiation requires a cease-fire 
between the combatants. Strategically, then, deploying troops (Africans and 
non-Africans) with robust logistical support to force an end to the fighting is 
the first step to engaging in peace negotiation and implementation. In this sense, 
force activation and deployment are predicted to lead to acceptance of a cease-
fire by both the Government of Sudan and its collaborators and the Sudanese 
Liberation Army and their collaborators as a precondition for peace and the 
concomitant negotiation/resolution of issues about justice. For an effective 
outcome, neither the government nor the rebels should have the power to veto 
the source of the troops and/or the type of logistical support available to the 
military intervention force. 
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Following the military intervention force, the AU must take decisive steps 
toward bringing the Government of Sudan, the Darfur representatives, the 
Sudanese Liberation Army, and the Justice and Equity Movement groups 
together to negotiate and correct whatever identified problems exist within the 
framework of Sudanese law and public policy. This must include the option 
of comprehensively federalising the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement with southern rebels to the rest of the country. Acting boldly in 
convening the groups in the Darfur crisis in its headquarters or another suitable 
location will establish the AU at the forefront of the responsibility to protect 
protocol provisions of both the UN and the AU. It will also ensure that the AU 
spearheads any final peace talks and will confirm to all the dedication of African 
governments to the guidelines of the AU charter and its commitment to avoiding 
the failures of the OAU. 
Given that the Sudanese government is reported to be ‘… inviting Arab tribesmen 
from Niger and Chad to occupy the lands vacated by the refugees’ (The Economist 
2007:55-56) in Darfur indicates at least its intent to ethnically cleanse the region 
and at worst, commit genocide. Because the Darfur crisis is an African problem 
with global implications, a basic responsibility for the AU would be to boldly and 
unequivocally label the crisis in Darfur as ethnic cleansing/genocide. This would 
include labeling the crisis a grave situation and a crime against humanity – a 
clear warning to the Khartoum-based Sudanese government and the Janjaweed 
leadership that failure to stop the large-scale violence will bring them up for 
charges on crimes against humanity consistent with the International Criminal 
Court provisions. This would have two immediate results: first, it would activate 
Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act requiring the organisation to take 
action; and second, it would avoid the definitional conflict over the term genocide 
and compel African governments to clearly identify their support for the AU’s 
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Constitutive Act to which they are signatories.7 With clear identification of the 
crisis as genocide/ethnic cleansing and with the presence of robust military 
intervention for purposes of establishing a cease-fire in the region, the AU should 
then place travel restrictions on the top leaders of the Government of Sudan 
and rebels responsible for atrocities, except for travel related to negotiation 
and resolution of the conflict. The strategy should include: freezing the bank 
accounts of all affected individuals and groups, imposing sanctions on Sudanese 
companies deemed to be complicit in any atrocities that the AU is attempting 
to bring to an end and compensating those whose actions help bring an end to 
large-scale violence. 
In addition, recognition and recognition withdrawal can be powerful and 
effective tools available to the African Union for carrying out its responsibility to 
protect vulnerable people in situations where African governments have failed 
to protect the people within their territories. In this case, and beyond, social 
primordial identities, and therefore group identities are constructed to create 
space for inclusion and exclusion. This approach ensures that the Fur or Arabs 
will remain who they are; however, the Sudanese state may or may not survive 
an identity reconstruction if war erupts across the country. Thus, while states in 
Africa as well as their membership in the African Union may eventually survive 
or die, it is individual primordial identities8 that are sustained over time as the 
basis for recognition of our individual existence. Furthermore, the artificially or 
socially constructed identities are political tools that can be used for purposes of 
ending conflicts like those in Sudan. In the formation of social or group identities, 
there is always an in-group such as the African Union or the United Nations 
which represents the desired group identity, and the non-group members such 
as states that have to adjust if admitted in order to remain members of the 
7 Clearly, an immediate implication of this bold action might be a threat to break up the 
organisation by some members, which might actually lead to the disintegration of the 
African Union. But it might also, on grounds of public opprobrium and support of civil 
society organisations, force member states to vote consistent with the provisions of the 
Constitutive Act to protect individuals/groups whose governments have chosen to ignore 
and/or violate their human and peoples’ rights – a welcome relief for the emergence of 
truly politically independent African states!
8 This section relies on the excellent explication of Al-Baqir al-Afif Mukhtar (2007).
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group. Thus, the African Union is the core group for African states who desire 
membership in the group. It occupies the centre stage of the group identity, and 
group membership for states such as Sudan or Nigeria should depend on their 
behaviour. The privileges of membership should draw the non-group states to 
seek inclusion. As such, the AU has the power to legitimise or de-legitimise the 
public behaviour of states, especially with regard to their policies toward the 
people in their territories. The power of recognition and its withdrawal then 
becomes a tool that enables the AU to monopolise the power to recognise or 
withdraw diplomatic recognition from members whose actions are judged 
repugnant to civilised standards – especially, when such actions include ethnic 
cleansing and/or genocide. Indeed, the power of recognition or its withdrawal 
seems to be the most powerful diplomatic tool available to the AU and members 
of the UN Security Council such as the United Kingdom and France who desire 
to do something to end large-scale violence characteristic of ethnic cleansing/
genocide without necessarily participating in joint military intervention with 
the AU forces. 
The power of recognition is not new as evidenced by the capacity of the United 
States’ legislature to include or exclude states on its ‘list of terrorist supporting 
states’. The Sudanese government was placed on this list in the 1990s and thus it 
sought to be excluded again when it pledged support for the war against terrorism 
after September 11th. Such diplomatic tools should be used by the African Union 
to recognise and/or withdraw recognition of African states and others whose 
actions support large-scale violence in the continent either through the supply 
of arms, the threat of the use of veto to obstruct the passage of UN Security 
Council resolutions on military interventions, and/or the use of state power in 
any form to undermine the responsibility to protect obligations of both the UN 
and the AU within Africa. 
Structurally, the current trials by the International Criminal Court (ICC) over 
the 1994 Rwandan Genocide offer a precedent and an avenue for the forthcoming 
AU Court of Justice to be the venue and structural platform for any future trials 
of Africans and their leaders who commit offences against humanity as codified 
in the Geneva Conventions. Such sanctions and legal actions within the continent 
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are likely to have a large positive impact, albeit symbolically; but they also signal 
Africans’ strong disapproval of existing policy and behaviour in Darfur. 
Similar to the grassroots efforts at divestment during the struggle against the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa, the movement for divestment in Sudan, mostly 
by groups in western countries is also important but should be complemented by 
similar movements sponsored by civil society organisations with help from the 
AU headquarters where appropriate. Non-governmental organisations receiving 
funding from companies and/or organisations whose income are derived from 
investment in the Sudan should refuse such funding in solidarity with the 
Darfuris. Collectively, African nations should not only cease doing business with 
companies identified as enhancing the capacity of the Sudanese government’s 
unwillingness to negotiate in good faith, but divest from them, going so far as to 
freeze the accounts of Chinese, Malaysian, Indian, and other states’ corporations 
that do not end their business with the government of Sudan. Recalling African 
ambassadors from major states – especially China and Russia, which are involved 
in the sensitive business of oil exploration, providing arms, weapons, and other 
support indirectly to the Janjaweed through the government of Sudan – would 
constitute a form of recognition withdrawal that will signal the seriousness 
of the AU’s desire to end large-scale conflicts in the continent. Additionally, a 
bold move against the Sudanese government would be the withdrawal of all 
AU member ambassadors and diplomats from Khartoum. In a sense, African 
de-legitimisation of the Sudanese state is predicted to intensify a crisis of 
identity for the ruling elites and might hasten an internal change of government 
for a more progressive one willing to work within the principles of the AU to 
protect the rights of all citizens within its member states. The recent AU decision 
to deny Sudan its bid to serve as the chair of the Union is a positive example 
of a unified strategy for sending a message of disapproval. Similar actions as 
suggested above would throw Sudan into shock. The AU must look to approve 
and encourage any and all possible strategic moves within its power and charter 
to force the parties back to the negotiating table on the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) signed May 5, 2006.
Since both the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Liberation Army/
Movement that signed the document have broken and violated its provisions 
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several times and since many of the Darfuris rebels have splintered into different 
factions, the AU must facilitate a renegotiation of the agreement. This effort 
assumes that a cease-fire as previously argued is enforced. As several reports as 
well as the continuing violence indicate, the growing factional divide since the 
drafting of the DPA shows a lack of political will and faith in its implementation. 
Therefore, the AU must take the lead in negotiations and diplomatic efforts to 
consolidate the numerous existing efforts (by Chad, Libya, Eritrea, and the UN) 
into a single plan under the AU umbrella. A recent Human Rights Watch report 
reiterated the need for the UN, Arab League, Government of Sudan, EU, and 
others to support the efforts of the African Union to maintain and expand its 
efforts of achieving peace in Darfur as well as keeping the organisation’s effective 
existence afloat (Human Rights Watch 2006:9-10). Again, the importance of 
the AU’s role in bringing about a successful result to any agreement requires 
maintenance and expansion of their current monitoring role to one of cease-
fire enforcement. The AU will succeed in its efforts at cease-fire enforcement 
and peaceful negotiation that ends the conflict and paves the way for political 
settlement of the Darfur crisis if practical strategies include confidence 
building among members of the various factions and communities within a 
familiar framework of local traditions. As Murithi (2005:76) notes, ‘For peace 
to be sustainable there needs to be a process of consultation and involvement 
of local grassroots populations as part of the process of re-emphasizing the 
inherent worth of traditions’. This will encourage confidence building and the 
establishment of trust and credibility for both the cease-fire enforcement and the 
eventual process of negotiating a lasting and sustainable peace in Sudan. Indeed, 
not paying attention to existing traditions and structures is the very problem that 
has plagued most of the approaches to development, economics, and politics 
in the continent. Ignoring existing structures and traditions implemented to 
deal with diverse situations as was the case in Darfur only intensifies conflicts 
whose origins and solutions are alien to the people whose lives are supposed to 
be transformed. By learning from and including traditional methods, the AU 
can capitalise on the rich history of enduring African cultures and methods of 
conflict resolution and management, and revitalise them as a parallel to formal 
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AU approaches to conflict management and peace enforcement, especially in 
less developed regions of the continent like Darfur. 
The African Union already has an ally on the ground to effectively begin a robust 
counter-strategy to the Sudanese government’s policies of reneging on the 
responsibility to protect obligation. Reports from the Christian Science Monitor 
indicate that, after promises of land, cattle, and money proved to be worthless, 
‘dozens of Janjaweed commanders [and their troops] are joining the struggle 
against the Sudanese government’ (Crilly 2007). This is a clear indication 
that if salient issues for each party, as previously argued, are identified and 
addressed, the crisis could be controlled. These defectors have played a crucial 
role in helping protect the roads from attacks, allowing convoys of food and 
humanitarian aid through to rural and formerly dangerous areas. By tapping 
into this group of sympathetic Sudanese Arabs, particularly those who have 
disassociated themselves from the Janjaweed and are working to protect civilians 
or defending them by joining SLA or JEM, the AU can identify those who still 
have ties to the Janjaweed and central government and place pressure on them 
to prepare for meaningful talks. These defectors and many other Sudanese 
‘Arab’ tribes exist within the Darfur region and have continuously opposed 
the Government of Sudan policy and refused to take part in the actions of the 
Janjaweed (Crilly 2007). Comprehensive talks would require these Arab groups 
to be involved and represented as a show of Darfurian unity and rejection of 
the entirely ‘ethnic’ nature of the conflict; as Prunier aptly notes, ethnic tensions 
‘were the raw materials, not the cause’ (Prunier 2006:200) of the large-scale 
violence in Darfur.
Clearly, there are strategic religious dimensions to the conflict in Darfur, but 
these need to be clarified to make sense of the recommendation below. The 
North-South conflict in Sudan since 1956 pitted Arab Muslims (north) against 
Black Christians (south); but the case of Darfur is different because the National 
Islamic Front (NIF) that controls the government of Sudan is engaged in a 
large-scale violence against Darfuris who are mostly Africans, but also Muslims. 
Therefore, considering the Islamist roots of the NIF and al-Bashir’s regime, the 
AU should counter its religious basis for power by strategically and diplomatically 
making the case that another Muslim-versus-Muslim conflict would shadow 
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the sectarian violence in Iraq. Also, the looming civil war among Palestinians 
is an affront to Islam and the unity of the ‘ummah’ or Muslim world. This is 
important since the NIF balks at claims of rape by Janjaweed members, or at 
least government support for it, as impossible and ‘un-Islamic’. This requires 
the inclusion of predominantly Muslim African nations such as Libya, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Algeria, and others who also hold seats in both the Arab League and 
the AU to use their influence in discussions with Sudan to compel the al-Bashir 
regime to ensure the protection of the Darfuris against rape, torture, murder 
and ethnic cleansing by other Muslims. The same can be said of Christian on 
Christian violence, as was the case in Rwanda.
In the end, the various actors in the Darfur crisis, especially states, are only 
likely to act when compelled by either positive or negative incentives to change 
their behaviour; and in contemporary international politics, only the US has 
the capability and credibility of action to effectively engage the various actors 
to resolve the Darfur crisis. But as was painfully pointed out by a guest on Wolf 
Blitzer’s Situation Room, in the realist world of politics, countries, including the 
US, never choose friends, but rather whatever is in their national interest at the 
time (Blitzer 2007). The question is: Does the responsibility to protect factor 
into the national interest of the United States, Russia, China and other capable 
major powers who are directly or indirectly involved with the Government of 
Sudan? The answer for now is no!
Therefore, the responsibility to protect, especially Africans, falls to the African 
Union. Its potential for doing well is boundless. At the least, the AU can succeed 
in establishing optimism and ‘override the sense of inevitability of crisis which 
has framed the way Africans and non-Africans have viewed the continent for 
decades’ (Murithi 2005:106). Its premise of Pan-Africanism and unity can be a 
way for the AU to convince Sudan to take strong steps to end the terror of the 
Janjaweed and prepare for a viable end to the conflict. In the meantime, ‘focusing 
on stabilizing Darfur in time for the 2009 midterm elections, security, political, 
and humanitarian assistance efforts must be supported by adequate funding and 
logistical support’ (United Nations Security Council 2007)9 by African states, 
9 See also Murray 2004:268.
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especially South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Libya that have professed a desire to 
see an end to the violence in Darfur. 
The AU has the tools it needs to become a solid entity in mediating African 
issues. It gains strength from the collective desire to uphold the responsibility to 
protect principle enshrined in both the UN and AU pronouncements. For the 
international community, especially members of the EU, NATO and the UN and 
for capable states such as the United States of America, the African Union has 
shown the desire to uphold the responsibility to protect. This is evidenced by 
their willingness to supply the troops for peace enforcement, but the AU lacks 
what those groups and nations have – robust and credible logistical equipment 
like helicopters, weapons and money to pay an over-stretched, underpaid, and 
unprepared African force – to succeed in an action that is clearly the collective 
responsibility of the international community if the UN Charter is to remain 
credible. For the AU, success can occur through logistic and financial support for 
the proposed hybrid UNMIS/AMIS force as well as the restart of peace talks as 
specified above. However, for a sustained capacity to influence external entities 
to help with African problems, or at least to not block action, especially at the 
Security Council, the AU should not hesitate to look beyond Africa for pressure 
and influence to force parties back to the table to make real decisions. Thus 
the AU maintains its position of leadership. An international community which 
focuses on African issues should be strategically institutionalised by funding an 
Africa Advocacy group in various countries – especially in those countries whose 
citizens and corporations are likely to be spoilers for African issues and policies 
in the international system. In the end, the assertion that only when Africa is 
neglected will it look to solve its own problems (Francis 2005:123), may be true 
here as the large-scale violence in Darfur did not become a major issue in much 
of the press in Africa until the international media picked up the cause in 2004. 
However the issue came to be a major event for Africa, its resolution requires the 
collective efforts of Africans, civil society organisations, governments, media, 
intellectuals and yes, external actors and organisations like the African Union 
to find a sustainable solution to crimes against humanity in the continent; so 
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